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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to examine how the driving forces of in-
vestment in a small country like Iceland diﬀer from those in larger countries.
Special attention is given to the dominating investment sector in Iceland due
to its resource intensity. Estimates are based on 1989-1999 panel data on
f o r e i g nd i r e c ti n v e s t m e n ti nv a r i o u ss e c t o r s . T h i sm a yh e l pe x p l a i nw h yt h e
investment pattern in Iceland diﬀers from the general case.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played an important role in the economic devel-
opment of many countries and proven to be an engine of economic growth (Grosse,
1997). Not only does FDI provide capital for development, but it also diversiﬁes
the capital base of countries. It is important for a small country like Iceland, in
need of a more diversiﬁed economy, to attract FDI in order to sustain economic de-
velopment and growth. FDI is generally believed to fuel economic growth, however
a recent study by Gylfason and Zoega (2001) shows that economic growth may be
hindered by the crowding out of physical and human capital by natural resource
capital. Moreover, an interesting study by Alfaro et al. (2001) ﬁnds economic
growth to be promoted by FDI in economies with suﬃciently developed ﬁnancial
markets. The nature of FDI in Iceland seems to diﬀer somewhat from FDI in other
countries; in the third thesis paper, FDI in Iceland is found to ﬂow particularly
into one sector, the power intensive sector. Because of this, it is important to see
to what extent natural resources drive Icelandic FDI and what factors lead to the
diversiﬁcation of this FDI across sectors.
A popular approach when analyzing the determinants of FDI is to apply the
factor proportions hypothesis as to consider FDI dependence on factor endowments
such as source and host country diﬀerences in skilled and unskilled labor. However,
for small resource based economies like Iceland, the dependence on skilled and
unskilled labor may not be the right endowment approach. Instead, resource based
endowments need to be brought into the picture in order to reﬂect on the country’s
heavy dependence on marine and hydropower resources.
Anecdotally, the investment dominance of the sector incorporating power in-
tensive industries is generally attributed to the smallness of Iceland, the nature
of its natural resources (its natural resources composition), and how distant it is
from other countries. In another paper by Kristjánsdóttir (2004c), driving forces
for Icelandic FDI are found to be diﬀerent from the general case when applying
the Knowledge Capital (KK) model speciﬁcation presented by Carr, Markusen and
1Maskus (CMM, 2001). But does this help explain why the sectorial composition
of Icelandic FDI seems to diﬀer from other countries?
The objective of this paper is to seek a clearer explanation for this by further
analyzing the sectorial decomposition of FDI. This paper is meant to explain the
relative contribution of various sectors to foreign direct investment. One of the
reasons for choosing the sectorial approach is to diﬀerentiate the power intensive
sector from other sectors. This is comparable to a recent paper by Waldkirch
( 2 0 0 3 )w h e r eh es e e k st oe x p l a i nh e a v yr e l i a n c eo fF D Ii no n ep a r t i c u l a ri n d u s t r y
in Mexico. However, Iceland diﬀers from Mexico in various ways such as by size,
location, and stage of development.
According to the factor proportions hypothesis, multinationals seek to integrate
production vertically across borders in order to take advantage of diﬀerent factor
prices resulting from relative diﬀerences in factor supplies between countries. The
factor proportions hypothesis has been a dominant explanation of multinational ac-
tivity within conventional trade literature (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman,
1985).
Since factor abundance is critically linked to factor intensity that may vary
across industries, one goal of this paper is to analyze whether the factor proportions
hypothesis can help explain the sectorial composition of FDI. CMM use skilled labor
percentages to represent factor abundance in the KK model speciﬁcation.
Both the work of CMM and subsequent studies ﬁnd that this is indeed important
for aggregate FDI levels. This paper oﬀers a reﬁnement of CMM’s KK model by
incorporating measures for small economic sizes in population and gross domestic
product (GDP) along with adding natural resource endowments to the conventional
speciﬁcation. The result supports the hypothesis that there are more factors at
work than the two factors of skilled and unskilled labor in the basic speciﬁcation.
Furthermore, this approach allows me to discuss how factor abundance may in-
ﬂuence the allocation of FDI across sectors. In particular the relation between FDI
and electricity prices may inﬂuence the predominance of FDI in the Icelandic power
intensive industry. Also, by sectorial disaggregation, it is possible to determine
2how the economic size variables in the CMM speciﬁcation aﬀect individual sectors.
Economic size is highly relevant in this paper, not only because the source countries
are considerably larger than the host country Iceland, but also because during the
research period a large part of FDI comes from one particular country, Switzer-
land. The dominance of Switzerland brings us back to the discussion on electricity
prices, hydropower and the power intensive industry. Switzerland has a history of
being specialized in using hydropower, as a natural resource, to generate electricity
for power intensive industries like the aluminum industry. However, in the 1990s
Switzerland had almost fully exploited its hydropower production potential (Czisch
et al., 2004, pp. 8-3). Thus Swiss ﬁrms may have been especially intensive in
hydroelectric power and actively seeking more of it. A prime example of this is
AluSwiss, a Swiss headquartered multinational enterprise (MNE), which undertook
greenﬁeld investment in an aluminum smelter in Iceland in the 1990s. Overall,
Icelandic foreign direct investment in power intensive industries greatly increased
in the 1990s. Thus one of my goals is to determine how hydropower electricity
prices aﬀects FDI in the power intensive industries. This is in addition to the
standard analysis of how skill diﬀerences between the source and the host country
aﬀect FDI.
Also, since ﬁshing is very important to the Icelandic economy, I include the total
ﬁsh stock caught in Icelandic waters in order to control for this factor. Moreover,
issues such as infrastructure, pollution quotas, and ﬁsh catch are accounted for in
this research. Since Iceland has a considerably larger pollution quota than all
other countries engaging in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change, this may
well aﬀect the sector allocation of FDI.
The estimates obtained in this paper are based on unique FDI panel data on
investment sectors in Iceland. The FDI data cover investments made by 17 source
countries over a period of 11 years. The FDI is classiﬁed into 4 major sectors.
These are as follows: power intensive industries (as sector 1), Commerce and Fi-
nance (sector 2), Telecom and Transport (sector 3), and ﬁnally Other industries
(sector 4). More speciﬁcally the fourth sector accounts for the following indus-
3tries: Manufacturing, Agriculture and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, and other
industries. Estimates are obtained for sector shares of country’s FDI as well as
levels of FDI in each sector, since FDI shares reﬂect the relative size of each sector
within a particular year of investment. The application of sector shares allows for
analyzing the relative importance of the power intensive sector compared with other
sectors. An example of an application of FDI share proxy can be found in a paper
by Brainard (1997). Brainard uses outward shares of U.S. sales to proxy FDI sector
shares. In the case of Brainard, it is reasonable to apply shares of U.S. aﬃliate sales
abroad as a proxy for outward FDI, rather than applying actual FDI data, because
a considerable amount of U.S. outward FDI is derived from mergers and acquisi-
tions. However, in the case of Iceland it is more reasonable to capture FDI with
actual FDI, since Iceland has a short history for FDI, and FDI in the dominating
power intensive industry has primarily been in the form of greenﬁeld investment.
In a related manner, Slaughter (2000) constructs an investment share variable as
the share of ”majority owned aﬃliates” in overall multinational investment.
Finally, one notable feature of the data is the large number of zeros, i.e. countries
that do not invest in a particular sector. Because of this, I control for whether
sample selection is driving my results, by using the Heckman’s (1979) two-step
procedure. In particular, since the theories of FDI assume a crucial role for ﬁxed
cost in determining whether FDI occurs, these ﬁnal results provide some potential
insights into this issue in a manner heretofore unexplored.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is laid out. Section 3
gives an overview of the data used in this research. Section 4 contains quantitative
results from the sectorial decomposition. In Section 5 results from using a sample
selection are introduced. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6.
42 Model Speciﬁcation
The main issue of concern in this paper is to capture the driving forces behind
investment incentives across sectors. In other words, to see whether it is pos-
sible to capture sector speciﬁc determinants of foreign direct investment. In an
earlier paper (Kristjánsdóttir, 2004), I provide analysis on how the CMM (2001)
speciﬁcation performs for small countries like Iceland. A potential reason for the
speciﬁcation’s poor results could be the dominance of one sector, the power intensive
sector. Therefore, the objective here is to reﬁne to the baseline CMM speciﬁcation
in order to allow for decomposition of FDI, and to determine what drives sector
speciﬁcF D I .
I do this in two ways. One is adding factors such as natural resources to an
improved version of the CMM speciﬁcation in order to adjust the model to a resource
based host country like Iceland. Thus, this is akin to the empirical trade literature
that found it necessary to bring in more factors in order to resolve Leontief’s classic
critique of the Heckscher Ohlin factor proportions theory. Potentially because the
CMM speciﬁcation is designed to capture the eﬀects of the level of skill on FDI,
rather than eﬀects of natural resources .
The breakdown of industries reveals that CMM performs diﬀerently for diﬀerent
sectors, although overall it still does not perform as expected. This leads me to a
gravity approach similar to that used in my earlier paper (Kristjánsdóttir, 2004b).
The motivation for estimating individual sector shares is obtained from Brainard
(1997). In her paper, Brainard applies ”the share of aﬃliate sales accounted for by
exports”...that is the...”share of exports in total sales” (Brainard, pp. 528)1.T h i s
corresponds to capturing the share of non-aﬃliate sales in total sales. Brainard is
thereby able to use an inverse proxy for the share of FDI in foreign MNEs activities2.
1Markusen (2002, pp. 409) says the following about the index used by Brainard in her 1997 pa-
per: ”The intra industry aﬃliate sales index measures the degree of international cross-investment
in a particular industry: production and sales abroad by US MNEs and production and sales in
the United States by foreign MNEs”.
2Outward aﬃliate sales relative to exports and inward aﬃliate sales relative to imports for 64
industries in the United States are given in Brainard (1997).
5The idea of using export shares is based on a similar argument as the one presented
in this paper. However, in this paper the objective is to capture the sector shares
of FDI. This is done by presenting the relative weight of sectors in those years
when some investment takes place. One of the advantages of measuring sectorial
FDI in shares, rather than levels, is that it reﬂects the relative weight of individual
sectors. The way the model speciﬁcation for shares is set up reﬂects the relative
amount of investment made within each year, no matter the actual size of FDI.
Thus, even when there is little total FDI (as is often the case in small countries
like Iceland) I can extract information from the data.3
An example using capital stock share to construct the dependent variable can
be seen in Slaughter (2002). Slaughter calculates the share of MOFAs4 in overall
MNEs investment (Slaughter, 2002, pp. 457), whereas here the estimates are based
on the share of sectorial FDI in overall FDI. Slaughter places the share of skilled
labor on the left hand side of the equation, and the share of capital stock on the
right hand side5. In my case, the share of capital stock is placed on the left hand
side, and skilled labor on the right hand side following the exogenous endowment
literature precedent.
When formulating the model speciﬁcation, I start by choosing the share of FDI
stock to be the dependent variable. The basic equation speciﬁcation can be esti-
mated as follows:
3Brainard (1997) believes that use of the share measure ”should mitigate some of the concern
about industry - country pair eﬀects”. This reasoning applies to my paper because I also deal
with industry-country pairs, which may vary a lot in the amount they invest. CMM need not to
deal with this issue in their paper, since they use time series data for countries and years. In his
paper, Slaughter (2002, pp. 454), says that he uses shares ”Because shares oﬀer a rough control
for some of these other forces acting MNE-wide I mostly focus on the share data. I interpret
rising shares of aﬃliate activity to be evidence of MNE transfer.”
4MOFA refers to majority-owned aﬃliates in which parent MNEs hold at least 50% stake. In
comparson, FDI generally refers to at least 10% ownership of a single parent MNE.
5The dependent share variable used by Slaughter is based on the skilled labor share in the total
wage bill. More speciﬁcally, he captures the share of skilled labor in the overall labor force by
deviding the wage of nonproduction workers (referred to as skilled labor) by the total wage bill to




= β0 + β1Ysumi,t + β2Ydiff
2
i,t + β3Sdiffi,t (1)
+β4Ydiffi,t∗Sdiffi,t + β5Invct + β6Tct
+β7Tct∗Sdiff
2
i,t + β8Tci,t + β9Disi + εi,s,t
In Equation (1) the dependent variable SHAREi,s,t represents investment share
of a particular sector s in particular year t by source country of investment i.
Equation (1) has an error term εi,t with E[εi,t | xi,t]=0 ,w h e r exi,t represents
the explanatory variables in the equation6. N o t et h a tb e c a u s ei ti sc r e a t e df r o m
stock data, the dependent share variable represents sector speciﬁcF D Id i v i d e db y
accumulated investment. More speciﬁcally the dependent variable SHAREi,s,t is
deﬁned as Fi,s,t divided by Fi,t, conditional on Fi,t > 0.T h e s h a r e o f F D I i n a
particular sector7 is calculated as FDI i,t =
Pn
s=1 FDI i,s,t where s r u n sf r o m1t on
,a n dne q u a l s4 .
The explanatory variables on the right hand side of the ﬁrst regression equation
are the same as in the CMM model speciﬁcation. I start out by including all the
variables in the CMM model, and then apply some data-driven reﬁnements. The
ﬁrst variable in Equation (1) is Ysumi,t representing the sum of the source and host
countries’ GDP. The variable coeﬃcient is typically expected to be positive, since
more investment is believed to take place with an increase in the economic size of
the source and recipient country. The second explanatory variable represents the
absolute size diﬀerence Ydiff2
i,t of source and host countries’ GDP. The coeﬃcient
sign is expected to be negative, since less investment is expected to take place as
size diﬀerence increases. The literature on horizontal multinational activities, e.g.
by Markusen (1984), explains well why more FDI is believed to take place between
countries of similar economic size.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h efactor proportions hypothesis, multinationals take advantage
6The coeﬃcient estimates are therefore consistent, although not eﬃcient.
7The share observations do not include the years when no FDI takes place.
7of factor price diﬀerences by fragmenting production vertically across countries de-
pendent on diﬀerence in relative factor supplies. Factor price diﬀerences give rise
to vertical FDI (Helpman, 1984). Here, I include skill diﬀerences which are meant
to account for diﬀerence in relative factor endowments. An analogous variable is
used by CMM (2001). FDI is expected to increase as the source country’s labor
force becomes increasingly more skilled relative to host, and therefore the variable
has a positive expected coeﬃcient sign. A term Ydiffi,t∗Sdiffi,t is also included
to capture the interaction between size and skill diﬀerences. The interaction term
reﬂects the importance of skilled labor diﬀerences, depending on the magnitude of
GDP diﬀerences between the source and host country. Furthermore, variables for
trade costs and investment costs are included in the model. The motivation for
including variables for trade and investment costs is to determine how investment
is aﬀected by restrictions of this type. An increase in investment costs of the
host country Invct is expected to decrease investment in the host. An increase in
t h eh o s tc o u n t r y ’ st r a d ec o s t sTct is expected to trigger FDI, since then the source
country is likely to prefer investment to costly trade. On the contrary, an increased
trade cost in the source country Tci,t is believed to decrease its interest in investing
in the host, since it becomes more costly for the source to import from overseas
aﬃliates. Moreover, the interaction between skill diﬀerences and trade cost of the
host Tct∗Sdiff2
i,t indicates the relevance of absolute skill diﬀerences, depending on
the magnitude of trade costs in the host country. The higher the trade cost, the
more important the skill diﬀerences. The variable coeﬃcient is expected to have a
positive sign.
The last variable in Equation (1) represents distance. Distance can be regarded
to be a proxy for transport costs and associated transaction costs. The inclusion
of distance to explain investment is well known in literature on FDI (CMM 2001;
Jeon and Stone, 1999; Bergstrand, 1986). FDI is believed to decrease as distance
between the source and host countries increases, and therefore the coeﬃcient sign
is expected to be negative.
In latter sections of this paper, some extensions of the basic model speciﬁcation
8are used, including some additional control variables. These control variables are
not in the model speciﬁcation presented by CMM. First of all, I use a variable
accounting for the catch in Icelandic waters. The main reason for including this
variable is that it captures ﬂuctuations in what has been referred to as the main nat-
ural resource of Iceland, the ﬁsh stock obtainable from the ﬁshing grounds around
the country. When the catch is large, this may draw labor or other resources from
FDI. Furthermore this eﬀect may vary across types of FDI. The variable Catcht
represents an index of the total ﬁsh catch in the host country Iceland. More specif-
ically the variable is deﬁned as ”Total catch at ﬁxed prices, Seasonal adj. Indices”.
The index runs through the whole estimation period from 1989 to 1999, where 1995
has been set as a base year with a value of one. The catch variable is obtained
from the National Economic Institute of Iceland. The second control variable used
in this paper is INFdiffi which represents diﬀerence in infrastructure between the
source and the host country in 1999. More speciﬁcally the variable can be presented
as INFdiffi ≡ (INFi−INF). All variables that represent diﬀerences between the
source and host country are presented as the source country value minus the host
country value. I use infrastructure to reﬂect host country competitiveness, partly
because countries endowed with natural resources for the power intensive industry
often suﬀer from poor infrastructure. These would for example be some of the
African and South American countries. Furthermore, for multinationals seeking
a power plant location, the strength of the infrastructure in Iceland can play an
important role. This infrastructure measure is obtained from the World Competi-
tiveness Yearbook 2000. The yearbook ranks countries by ”competitiveness input
factors”, where infrastructure is one of them. Countries listed in the yearbook
run from 1 to 47, with 1 being the most competitive country. By pooling a range
of diﬀerent competitiveness factors together, an overall competitiveness index is
formed8. A ni n c r e a s ei nt h eINFdiffi variable indicates that the host country
has increasingly less infrastructure, whic hm a yo rm a yn o ti n c r e a s eF D Ii nt h eh o s t
8Iceland was listed as the 17th most competitive country in 1999, moving up from being number
19 in 1998.
9(Iceland). Therefore the coeﬃcient sign can be expected to be either positive or
negative. Table 1 provides an overview of the variables used in this paper.





Share of foreign direct investment (FDI) made by the
source country (i) in the host country (j), in sector
(s), over time (t).
Fdii,s,t
Foreign direct investment made by source country (i)
in the host country (j), in sector (s), over time (t).
Ysumi,t
The sum of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
the source country (i) and the GDP of the host coun-




The GDP of the source country (i) minus the GDP
of the host country (j), squared over time (t). —
Sdiffi,t
Skilled labor in the source country (i) minus skilled
labor in the host country (j), over time (t). +
Ydiffi,t∗Sdiffi,t
Interation term, capturing the interaction between
the GDP diﬀerence of the source and host countries
and the skill diﬀerence variable, over time (t).
—
Invct
The investment cost foreign investors are faced with
when investing in the host country (j), over time (t). —
Tct Trade costs in the host country (j), over time (t). +
Tct∗Sdiff2
i,t
Interaction term, capturing interaction between
trade costs in the host country and squared skill dif-
ferences, over time (t).
+
Tci,t Trade cost in the source country (i), over time (t). —
Disi
Geographical distance between the source country (i)
and the host country (j), in kilometers. —
Catcht
The ”total catch index” for the host country, Iceland.
The index represents development in overall catch in
Icelandic waters. With 1995 as a base year.
+
INFdiffi
Infrastructure index diﬀerences between the source
country (i) and the host country (j), in 1999. +/—
POLLdiffi
Pollution Quota diﬀerences between the source coun-




Government Stability diﬀerences between the source
country (i) and the host country (j). +/—
Two more control variables are applied in the basic KK model speciﬁcation,
these are POLLdiffi and GMTSTdiffi,t.T h e v a r i a b l e POLLdiffi represents
10the diﬀerence in pollution quota in the source and host country. The data are
classiﬁed as ”Quantiﬁed emission limitation or reduction commitment”, (percentage
of base year or period) and obtained from the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change9. The Third Kyoto session was signed
in December 199710. A ni n c r e a s ei np o l l u t i o nd i ﬀerence of the source and host
country indicates an increase in the pollution quota of the source relative to the
host. An increase in this type of pollution quota is likely to diminish investment in
pollutive industries in the host country, such as the power intensive industry. The
measures for government stability refer to both countries and time, and the variable
is denoted as GMTSTdiffi,t. Higher numberical value for stability is interpreted
as a more stable economy. These Government Stability data are the year beginning
data, however the data for Germany run only from 1991 (since German uniﬁcation).
This variable is meant to reﬂect the relative stability of the Icelandic government,
where and increase in diﬀerence can be expected to either stimulate or hinder FDI.
The government stability data is obtained from the International Country Risk
Guide.
9What is of interest in this protocol is that Iceland has highest quota of all countries listed.
10More information on the Kyoto Protocol are to be found in Appendix B.
113D a t a
The database on FDI and the share of FDI in various sectors in Iceland covers
investments made by the main source countries of investment in Iceland over the
time period 1989-1999. In order to give a taste of what is in the data, Table 2
classiﬁes the sample countries by their share in overall FDI in Iceland. There are
17 source countries in the sample which account for about 99% of total FDI11.
The percentage shares presented in Table 2 indicate that there is a substantial
diﬀerence in the amount of investment made by various countries, with Switzerland
being the main source country of foreign direct investment.
Table 2. Major Source Countries of FDI (1995 US dollars).
The Countries Reported Account for the Biggest Part of FDI.
Switzerland 1,095,079,000 Sweden 65,178,950
United States 485,395,200 Luxembourg 58,259,560
Denmark 213,626,400 Germany 43,424,390
Norway 191,819,600 Finland 11,947,020
United Kingdom 112,070,400 Belgium 9,159,265
Japan 65,231,580 Netherlands 4,879,091
Source: Central Bank of Iceland.
The second major source country of investment in Iceland is the United States,
with Denmark being the third. The sample countries with the least amount of
investment in Iceland are Australia, Canada, Spain, Austria, and France. These
countries are not displayed in Table 2, but are still used in estimation.
Table 3 exhibits the share of each sector in overall investment over the period of
estimation. The sector disaggregation is as follows: the power intensive industry as
sector 1, commerce and ﬁnance industry as sector 2, the telecom industry and the
transport industry as sector 3, and ﬁnally sector 4 accounts for all other industries.
More speciﬁcally, sector four accounts for the following industries: manufacturing,
agriculture and ﬁshing, mining and quarrying and other industries.
11Countries accounting for the remaining investment are: Chile, Faeroe Islands, Gibraltar, Israel,
Latvia, Russian Federation.
12Table 3. Decomposition of FDI in Iceland (1995 US dollars).
Sector Allocation of Industries
Sector 1 - Power Intensive 1,524,921,000
Sector 2 -C o m m e r c e
-F i n a n c e
468,544,300
Sector 3 - Telecom
- Transport
50,800,210
Sector 4 -M a n u f a c t u r i n g
-O t h e r
316,047,200
Total 2,360,312,710
Source: Central Bank of Iceland
D u et ot h el o wo v e r a l lF D I ,t h ep r o c e d u r ei st od e c o m p o s ei n v e s t m e n ti n t oa
few main subsectors. When doing this, it is logical to separate the power intensive
industry from the others due it its size. Subsequently, following previous research,
the sectors are now classiﬁed with Commerce and Finance as sector 2, and Telecom
and Transport12 as sector 3. Sector 4 is primarily Manufacturing. However, Agri-
culture, Fishing, as well as Mining and Quarrying are classiﬁed with manufacturing,
b u tt h e s ea r eav e r ys m a l lp a r to fF D I . T o g e t her Agriculture, Fishing, and the Min-
ing and Quarrying sector accounted for less than 2.5% of total FDI. It is worth
noting that even though there is very small FDI in Fishing, the Fishing industry
has been a dominant domestic industry in Iceland in the last several decades.
The numbers presented are inward stocks of FDI in Iceland, represented in 1995
US dollars. Data on FDI stock in Iceland are obtained from the Central Bank of
Iceland. In a recent paper by Davies (2002), the advantages of using FDI stock are
12More speciﬁcally, the sector classiﬁcation is often times ”Transport & Communication” (Guo
Ju-e, 2000), but I found it to be more direct to call it ”Transport & Telecom”.
13well explained, as well as the reason it can be more applicable than FDI ﬂows or
aﬃliate sales representing multinational activities. Data on the level as well as the
share of FDI are kindly provided by the Central Bank of Iceland.
Table 4. Summary Statistics
Variable Units Obs Mean StD. Min Max
Sharei,s,t Index [0,1] 568 0.25 0.39 0 1
Fdii,s,t Million USD 748 3.16 13.89 -0.95 157.9339
Ysumi,t Trillion USD 740 1.23 1.96 0.02 8.59
Ydiff2
i,t 740 5.29 13.78 0.00005 73.51
Sdiffi,t Index [-1,1] 516 0.03 0.06 -0.08 0.14
Ydiffi,t∗Sdiffi,t 516 0.04 0.22 -0.27 1.11
Invct Index [0,100] 340 33.01 1.92 29.92 35.28
Tct Index [0,100] 340 48.18 3.79 43.7 52.50
Tct∗Sdiff2
i,t 260 0.18 0.25 0.00002 0.85
Tci,t Index [0,100] 748 27.88 11.18 5.30 64.80
Disi Million Kilometers 748 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.02
Catcht Fish Quota Index 748 1.01 0.04 0.92 1.07
INFdiffi Compet. Index 748 -1.76 6.44 -11 10
POLLdiffi Poll. Quota Index 748 -0.16 0.04 -0.18 -0.02
GMTSTdiffi,t Govmt Stab. Index 740 -0.09 1.49 -4 5
Sources: Central Bank of Iceland, Economic Institute of Iceland, Distance Calculator, Inter-
national Labor Organization, World Bank, World Competitiveness Report, Kyoto Protocol.
Table 4 represents an overview of the overall sample, where the total number of
observations is the multiplication of the 17 countries, 4 sectors and 11 years.
In his paper, Slaughter (2002, p. 454), says that he uses shares ”Because shares
oﬀer a rough control for some of these other forces acting MNE-wide I mostly focus
on the share data. I interpret rising shares of aﬃliate activity to be evidence of
MNE transfer.”
Data on GDP, both in sum and squares, are taken from the World Bank CD
Rom (2002), and are in constant 1995 US dollars. Data on GDP in Germany in
141989 and 1990 are not included here, since these are the years before the uniﬁcation
of Germany. Data on investment and trade costs are obtained from the World Com-
petitiveness Report and data on distance comes from the Distance Calculator. The
quota index for the catch variable is obtained from the former Economic Institute
of Iceland. Data on Infrastructure are obtained from the World Competitiveness
Yearbook 2000. Data on pollution quotas come from the Kyoto Protocol (1997) in
the section on country-by-country emission targets. The government stability data
is obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), published by The
PRS Group on Government Stability13. All regressions results are obtained using
STATA version 7.0.
13More speciﬁcally it is taken from: Political Risk Points by Component, Table 3B.
154 Estimation Results
4.1 FDI Shares, Basic Speciﬁcation
This section provides us with results for shares of individual sectors. In the standard
models, there are generally two sectors: an FDI sector x and a numerarie sector
y. In reality, a single FDI sector x is really several sectors in which there is FDI.
Here, I analyze four such sectors, i.e. I decompose x into x1, x2, x3, and x4.
An overview of the regression results for the CMM speciﬁcation in Equation (1)
a ss h o w ni nT a b l e5 14.
Table 5. CMM Speciﬁcation for Sector Shares
















































































































Observations 57 57 57 57 171
R-squared 0.64 0.39 0.31 0.51 0.09
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coeﬃcients. ***, ** and * denote
signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
14All robust t-statistics are calculated using White’s (1980) heteroskedaticity correction.
16Some changes in exogenous variables can be important for some sectors and not
others. This is what the research for sector shares tests for. If variable estimates
for an individual sector in Table 5 are insigniﬁcant, it does not indicate that chosen
variables do not aﬀect the level of FDI in any sector. What it does indicate is that
t h ev a r i a b l ei nq u e s t i o na ﬀects FDI levels in each sector in roughly a proportional
fashion. If this were true for all variables, then the standard way of estimating
FDI (aggregating across sectors and using a single FDI variable) might be suﬃcient.
What this approach adds to the debate is that the standard approach may overlook
important heterogeneity across sectors. Furthermore, this indicates that the factor
p r o p o r t i o n sh y p o t h e s i sc a nb ei m p o r t a n te v e nw i t h i nw h a ti st y p i c a l l yc a l l e dx,i . e .
it can aﬀect x1a n dx2d i ﬀerently.
In Table 5, the ﬁrst two size variables are estimated to be signiﬁcant, however
with coeﬃcient signs diﬀe r e n tf r o mw h a ti sp r e d i c t e db yt h et h e o r y . T h en e g a t i v e
coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst variable indicates that the share of the power intensive sector,
in overall investment, decreases with an increase in the sum of the economic size of
the host and the source country. When the investment weight of small countries in
Table 2 is considered, especially Switzerland, these results need not be surprising.
As for the second variable, a positive coeﬃcient indicates that as the squared dif-
ference between the source and host country increases, FDI in sector one increases
relative to other sectors. Taken together the results for the ﬁrst two variables
are somewhat puzzling, since it seems as they go against each other. One way of
interpreting this is to say that the share of sector one, in overall FDI, is negatively
aﬀected by an increased in the size of the source countries; however the relationship
can be regarded as increasing based on the positive sign of the latter size variable,
so that the relationship is negative but increasing15. Estimates for sectors 2 to 4
indicate that the coeﬃcient signs for the ﬁrst two size variables have signs opposite
from that which is obtained for the ﬁrst sectors. This indicates that forces driving
15This interpretation refers to the fact that the variation in the size variables is primarily due
to variation in the size of the source country, since almost all source countries are considerable
larger than the host country, Iceland.
17investment in sectors 2 to 4 are of diﬀerent nature from those driving investment
in the ﬁrst sector. What is interesting is that economic size is only estimated to
be of signiﬁcant importance in the case of the power intensive industry, not other
industries.
The results obtained for distance indicate that an increase in distance of 1 million
kilometers is predicted to decrease the share of the power intensive sector one by
about 31%, or (based on the average distance measures in Table 4) a more realistic
thing would be to say that a distance increase by 100,000 would result in a 3%
decrease in sector one investment16.
In Table 5 foreign direct investment (FDI) is disaggregated into four sectors.
These are the power intensive industry in Iceland as sector one, commerce and
ﬁnance as sector two, the telephone and transport industries as sector three, and
other industries as sector four17. Finally industries 2, 3, and 4 are aggregated in the
last column. Sector one is not included in last column since by deﬁnition the share
of all sectors combined is always one. The addition of sectors 2, 3, and 4, provided
in the last column, is presented to reﬂect on the interaction between sector 1 and
all remaining sectors. The ﬁrst column shows estimates for sector one. Overall,
an increase in distance shifts FDI from sectors 1 - 3 into sector 4. It may or may
not increase the level of FDI in any single sector18.
When the skill diﬀerence variable Sdiffi,t is considered, it turns out that it
is not found out to be signiﬁcant (neither when estimated individually, nor when
estimated as an interaction term with other variables)19.
16Note that all inference assums normality, thus the usual caveats to this discussion apply.
17More speciﬁcally sector four accounts for the following industries: Manufacturing, agriculture,
ﬁshing, mining and quarrying and other industries.
18For example in Table 6 in Kristjánsdóttir (2004c), it could be that distance has a negative
coeﬃcient across the board, which it does. This means that an increase in distance decreases
FDI in all sectors.
19A potential way to analyze the skill variable further would be to apply the same procedure
as Markusen and Maskus (MM, 2002). MM include skill diﬀerences in two interaction terms,
accounting for the cases seperately when skill diﬀerences are positive and negative. This approach
has the advantage that only two more degrees of freedom are lost, when compared to the CMM
model. However, the approach applied by Blonigen, Davies and Head (BDH, 2003) involves a
much greater loss of degrees of freedom, since it implies a division of the sample to two subsamples,
depending on the whether skill diﬀerences are positive or negative.
18When it comes to the variables for host country investment cost Invct,a n d
host trade cost Tct as well as the interaction between trade cost host and skill
diﬀerences Tct∗Sdiff2
i,t, they are all estimated to be insigniﬁcant. Taken together
these results may be interpreted such that the variables do not aﬀect FDI allocation
to diﬀerent sectors. In other words, it can be said that MNEs do not choose one
sector rather than another based on these factors; the sectors are all equally sensitive
to changes in these variables. Recall, however, that FDI levels may change, thus
this is not itself a rejection of the factor-proportions hypothesis.
Let us then consider the variable for trade cost in the source country Tci,t. It
is estimated to be positively signiﬁcant in the case of sector 1 and negative for
sectors 2 and 3. The positive coeﬃc i e n tc a nb ei n t e r p r e t e ds u c ht h a ta ni n c r e a s e
in source country trade cost has positive eﬀects on the share of sector one in overall
investment, while the contrary holds for other sectors. One way of interpreting these
results is to say that only for sector one does high trade cost trigger investment.
An increase in trade cost in the source country might trigger investment in sector
one only if the goods produced by the power intensive sector are not faced with
conventional trade costs when shipped back home. This possibility is explored in
Section 5.
Finally, the distance variable is estimated to be signiﬁcantly negative for sectors
1 through 4. This greater distances seem to hurt FDI in these industries relative
to the manufacturing heavy sector 4.
The last column accounts for sectors 2, 3, and 4, and the number of observations
in the last column is the sum of observation number for 1-3 sectors. The estimates
obtained for the regression in the last column are insigniﬁcant, except the source
trade cost, consistent with the regressions on sectors.
Many of the variables are estimated to be insigniﬁcant in Table 5. Therefore, it
is interesting to continue the research by estimating levels of FDI, since the CMM is
designed for level estimates and therefore has potential to do better for levels than
shares. Furthermore, these results describe relative shares across sectors, which
leaves out potential information regarding levels of FDI in each sector.
195 FDI Levels, Tobit Estimates
I next investigate the degree to which sectorial FDI can be explained, when pre-
sented in levels, rather than shares of FDI like before. By doing so, it is possible
to capture the eﬀects of the CMM speciﬁcation variables on actual levels of FDI.
Table 6. Tobit Estimates for the CMM Model Speciﬁcation
















































































































Total Obs. 65 65 65 65 195
Left cens.
obs. Fdi≤0
47 29 50 21 100
Uncen. obs. 18 36 15 44 95
Pseudo
R-sq.
0.21 0.29 0.38 0.17 0.07
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coeﬃcients. ***, ** and * denote
signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
20In Table 6 the results for level estimates are presented. The main diﬀerence
between estimating shares or levels of FDI is that the level estimates allow us to
determine the direct variable eﬀects on the level of investment, while share estimates
indicate how the share of FDI in individual sectors is determined.
By presenting FDI in levels rather than shares, estimates for individual sectors
are independent of estimates for other sectors. In Table 6 the Tobit estimates for
individual sectors are introduced. The row labelled ”left censored” observations in
Table 6 represents those observations that are zero or negative. The left censored
observations are in most cases zero values20, since the observations are rarely neg-
ative21. There is a higher number of left censored observations in sectors 1 and 3
than there is in sectors 2 and 4. This is as could be expected, since sectors 2 and
4 are composed of a bigger variety of industries than 1 and 3.
It appears that the size variables continue to have the same signs for sectors 1
and 4 as those in Kristjánsdóttir (2004c). This may provide further support for the
hypothesis that estimates for sectors 2-4 combined are crowded out by the power
intensive sector due to the power sector size.
What is also noteworthy in Table 6 is that the skill diﬀerence variable is not
estimated to be signiﬁcant for individual sector FDI. This suggests that skilled labor
diﬀerences do not have signiﬁcant impact on the amount of FDI in individual sectors.
An exception, though, maybe found for sector 2, where both of the interaction
terms are estimated to be signiﬁcant. The signiﬁcance of the interaction terms
in the case of sector 2 can be interpreted such that endowments of skilled labor
may be important in the telecom industry, especially during periods of Icelandic
protectionism. What is also of particular interest in sector one is that distance is
not estimated to be signiﬁcant, indicating that other factors than distance are more
important when multinationals choose to invest in Iceland.
20The Tobit lower limit is set at zero, then negative values are not trucated but accumulated
around the zero value. The overall results are weak because of how many observations are left
censored.
21However, negative observations are identiﬁed in the case of France, UK, Luxembourg, Norway
and Sweden.
21On the whole however, the CMM speciﬁcation of the KK model does not seem
to do well either when I estimate FDI in levels, since most of the variables are
insigniﬁcant.
There is reason to expect that variation in the power intensive sector may be
driving the results for level estimates of FDI. This is because investment in the
power industry is often a lump sum investment indicative of high ﬁxed costs. Alter-
natively, it may be that the baseline CMM speciﬁcation ignores important omitted
variables. I investigate this in the next section.
226F D I L e v e l s , M o d i ﬁcation of the CMM Speciﬁ-
cation
Let us next investigate estimates for an alternative model speciﬁcation. The new
speciﬁcation is presented in Equation (2):
Fdii,s,t = β0 + β1Ysumi,t + β2Ydiff
2
i,t + β3Sdiffi,t (2)
+β4Disi + β5Catcht + β6INFdiffi + εi,s,t
The variables in Equation (2) that are originated in the CMM speciﬁcation are
the two ﬁrst variables accounting for economic size, the third variable represents
skills, and the fourth variable distance. The reason for the choice of those particular
variables from the CMM speciﬁcation is that, for the ﬁrst thing, determination
of size eﬀects are a key issue in the case of Iceland (due to its smallness) and
distance is also very important (due to the country’s geographical location). Finally
the variable accounting for skilled labor endowments is a crucial variable in the
Knowledge-Capital framework.
Variables for trade costs and investment cost are not included in Equation (2)
for two reasons. First, because there is reason to expect these not to be directly
applicable to inward FDI in Iceland, since the host country trade and investment
cost is estimated to have low signiﬁcance. Second, although signiﬁcant, source
country trade cost is not of primary interest for inward FDI in Iceland. Also as
Table 4 in Section 3 reveals, the trade and investment costs together with interaction
terms have the fewest observations of all the variables and therefore act as being
most restrictive.
Two new variables are introduced in Equation (2), these are Catcht which is
an index for ﬁsh catch in Icelandic waters, and INFdiffi cross sectional variable
accounting for diﬀerences in infrastructure of the source and the host. More specif-
ically, the Catcht variable captures how investment incentives are aﬀected by the
size of available ﬁsh stock in Icelandic waters, and infrastructure INFdiffi in Ice-
23land compared to the infrastructure in source countries (in the year 1999). These
new variables are interesting for the reason that they reﬂect upon issues concerning
horizontal and vertical foreign direct investment. By incorporating a proxy for the
main natural resource of Iceland, the ﬁshing area, it helps indicate further whether
the sources of FDI are of vertical nature (that is, whether FDI is driven by cheap
access to natural resources, as a form of relative endowments)22. Based on the fact
that FDI in ﬁsheries (ﬁsh processing ﬁrms and trollers) is prohibited in the period
analyzed, we now want to estimate whether we can identify whether FDI is aﬀected
by the catch variable.
Table 7. New Model Speciﬁcation for FDI Levels

















































































Observatons 129 129 129 129 516
R-squared 0.19 0.09 0.16 0.60 0.07
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coeﬃcients. ***, ** and * denote
signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
22W h i c hb r i n g su sb a c kt ot h efactor proportion hypothesis.
24Furthermore, FDI in various sectors is potentially aﬀected by ﬂuctuations in the
ﬁshing industry. This is due to the dominance of the ﬁshing industry and related
industries. The inclusion of the catch variable is particularly interesting when
considering FDI in the power intensive sector, for two reasons: First because the
economy is heavily dependent on these two industries, and second because these
industries are both related to the two main natural resources of Iceland. Estimates
obtained for Equation (2) are presented in Table 7.
An e g a t i v es i g no ft h ec a t c hc oe ﬃcient would give indication of that there existed
some substitutional eﬀects, since it indicates that FDI decreases as catch increases,
t h a ti s ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h eﬁshing industry has negative eﬀects on FDI in sector
4 (other industries)23. Although the catch variable is estimated to have negative
coeﬃcient for individual sectors, as well as for all sectors combined24,i ti so n l y
signiﬁcant in the case of the Telecom and Transport sector.
Moreover, estimates for the infrastructure variable INFdiffi indicate that in-
vestment is reduced in sectors 1 and 3, as the infrastructure in the source countries
improves. This would be consistent with a story in which power intensive ﬁrms
would seek to invest in the power intensive sector (sector 1) in Iceland, dependent
on Iceland’s ﬁrm infrastructure. Another noteworthy result in Table 7 is that
estimates are primarily signiﬁcant in the case of sector 1 and 4. Also the skill
diﬀerence variable is estimated to be insigniﬁcant in most cases, with the exception
of the power intensive industry, where a negative coeﬃcient indicates that FDI is
increases in a sector as Iceland becomes more skilled than the source country.
23Even if the ﬁshing industry has been important in its contribution to GDP, it is classiﬁed
with ”other industries” when considering FDI, because of restrictions on foreigners to undertake
investment in the ﬁshing industry.
24All sectors combined, are here referred to as ALL STS, that is the last column. Recall that
here, I am using levels of FDI, not shares.
257 FDI Levels, Sectors of Allocation
Next I include sector dummies, as given in Equation (3), to capture sector speciﬁc
eﬀects.
Fdii,s,t = β0 + β1Ysumi,t + β2Ydiff
2
i,t + β3Sdiffi,t
+β4Disi + β5Catcht + β6INFdiffi (3)
+γ2Ds2 + γ3Ds3 + γ4Ds4 + εi,s,t
In Equation (3) the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst sector γ1 has been set equal to zero.
Table 8. Fixed Sector Eﬀects for Levels of FDI


























DSector_2 Com. & Fin. −7.911∗∗∗
(−3.09)
DSector_3 Tel. & Trans. −9.871∗∗∗
(−3.89)








Note: See note following Table 7.
26The estimates obtained indicate that sector 2, 3, and 4 are estimated to have
signiﬁcantly less FDI than sector 1, since the coeﬃcients of the dummy variables
for sectors 2, 3, and 4 are all estimated to be negative. The other coeﬃcients are
comparable to the last column of Table 7, indicating that there is more variation
within sectors over time than between individual sectors.
Furthermore, in order to consider other types of ﬁxed eﬀects than ﬁxed sector
eﬀects, I also tested whether there was diﬀerence in investment between the three
major legal regimes foreign investors are f a c e dw i t hw h e nc o n s i d e r i n gI c e l a n da sa n
investment option.
”Icelandic legislation providing permission for inward foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Iceland is from 1991. However, this legislation
allowed for limited inward FDI, since FDI was not allowed in ﬁsheries
or the ﬁshing industry. By laws from 1993 companies from all countries
were allowed to invest in Iceland, regardless of domestic restriction in
the parent country. Finally by legislation from 1996, foreigners were
allowed to make indirect investment in ﬁsheries and the ﬁshing industry
in Iceland.” Act on Investment (1996), based on the Icelandic Govern-
ment Gazette.
The division applied to test for ﬁxed eﬀects between law regimes, relied on Act
on Investment (1996). The ﬁxed eﬀects tested account for three legal regimes.
The ﬁrst regime ranges from 1989-1992, the second regime from 1993-1995, and the
last regime from 1996-1999. However, the results obtained indicated that there
did not appear to be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between subperiods. More speciﬁcally,
legal regimes two and three do not appear to be diﬀerent from the ﬁrst legal regime.
Therefore, these results indicated that relaxation in the legal environment over time
did not trigger investment, and the results are therefore not reported.
278 Sample Selection
One of the features of Icelandic FDI data is the large number of zero observations.
This is particularly true for sector level data. Therefore in order to determine
whether my estimation results are driven by sample selection, I turn to using the
so-called Heckman selection model, or the Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure
estimation technique.
An example of Heckman applied to FDI data can be found in Razin, Rubinstein
and Sadka (2003), where they apply the procedure to analyze FDI ﬂows. Their
reasoning for using Heckman is to oﬀer what they refer to as ”yet another reconcili-
ation of the Lucas’ paradox, based on ﬁxed setup costs of new investments” (Razin
et al., 2003). By referring to the Lucas (1990) paper, where Lucas asked why capi-
tal does not seem to have tendency to ﬂow from rich to poor countries, they include
the Heckman procedure in order to simultaneously estimate country selection for
FDI and the determinants of FDI ﬂows. Following the same procedure as Razin
et al., I start out with the same set of variables in both the ﬁr s ta n dt h es e c o n d
step of the Heckman procedure. According to Jeroen Smits (2003) discussion on
the Heckman model, it is desirable for the selection equation to contain at least one
variable that is unrelated to the dependent variable used in the second stage. If
such a variable is not present (and sometimes even if such a variable is present),
there may arise severe problems of multicollinearity. Addition of the correction
factor to the substantial equation may also lead to estimation diﬃculties and un-
reliable coeﬃcients. In addition to using the Heckman procedure in this section I
focus only on sector one, the power intensive sector. The power intensive indus-
tries are important for Iceland, since it produces considerable amount of aluminum,
despite its small economic size. In 1997 Iceland was ranked 27th on the list of
world aluminum producing countries (Wagner, 1998), a high rank for such a small
country. Because of the importance of aluminum production making it the single
biggest investment industry, it is the biggest single industry in FDI, and thus my
section of focus.
288.1 LEVELS Heckman for the KK model
Since the KK model is the one currently in vogue, here I begin using the KK model
on level data. That is, the Heckman procedure25 is applied to level FDI data on a
modiﬁed version of the KK model.
E s t i m a t e si nT a b l e s9 Aa n d9 Bs h o wr e s u l t sf o rt h r e ed i ﬀerent regressions. More
speciﬁcally, Table 9A shows results for the Heckman ﬁrst step, while Table 9B shows
results for the second step. The diﬀerence between the three results lies within
the ﬁrst Heckman step26.I n t h e ﬁrst step, the likelihood of some FDI occurring is
estimated by the Probit technique. In column (1) there is the same set of variables
in the ﬁrst and second step, in column (2) pollution Pdiffi,1997 is added to the ﬁrst
step, and in column (3) diﬀerence in government stability is added GMTSTdiffi,t.
The pollution variable is included in order to reﬂect on the pollution quota diﬀerence
between Iceland and the source countries27. It is based on percentage pollution
quota deviation of source countries from the host country quota. These are obtained
from the 1997 Kyoto agreement28.
25For more information see Greene (1997).
26In the ﬁrst Heckman model for FDI levels, regressions were done on the full KK model
speciﬁcation. These KK variables were included in both step one and two, but then I only get
18 observations. Therefore, I considered these to be too few for the Heckman procedure to work
eﬀectively. The next regression was run with fewer variables, leaving out the variables that limted
the sample size the most. These are trade cost for host and source, as well as investment cost
host and the term for interaction between trade cost host and skill diﬀerences.
Variables from the restricted version of the KK model are applied together with an energy
index. This index is a proxy of the endowment factor of natural resources. Since data on
wholesale electricity prices of various countries are only available for 1999, it only provides us with
country speciﬁc data. I therefore chose to create my own energy index, which combines the price
of wholesale electricity in Iceland with the world USD price of oil. The index was calculated so
that it represents the electricity price of the dominating wholesale electricity company in Iceland,
divided by the world oil price. Three versions of this index are applied here, ﬁrstly the plain
ratio, then the ratio of one year lagged variables, and ﬁnally a ratio of two year lagged variables.
None of these regression results are shown here, since these speciﬁcations did not turn out to be
informative, especially not the marginal incentives for making FDI.
27According to the Kyoto Protocol, the pollution submission allowance for Iceland is substain-
tially higher than that for most other countries. Iceland received a quota of 110% while most
other nations reveived a quota of 92%.
28Quantiﬁed emission limitation or reduction commitment, (percentage of base year or period).
29Table 9A. KK model (LEVELS) Sample Selection
F i r s tS t e pP r o b i tR e s u l t s
(1) (2) (3)










































Note: Heckman’s consistent Z - values are in parenthesis below coeﬃcients.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
The variables presented in the Probit part determine the probability that some
positive investment takes place in industry one. As in the Razin et al. (2003),
the Probit zero/one binary distribution can be regarded to be a threshold measure
of whether investment takes place, and can therefore be regarded to proxy ﬁxed
investment costs. However, in the second Heckman step, an OLS procedure is
applied to capture marginal eﬀects on the dependent variable by the explanatory
variables.
The diﬀerence between the regressions presented in Table 9 is reﬂected in a
diﬀerent set of explanatory variables in Table 9A. One of the interesting things
about the regression results is that skill diﬀerences are estimated to be negative.
A negative sign indicates that as source country becomes more skilled abundant,
ﬁxed costs are higher (ﬁrst step), and so are the marginal costs (second step).
Other estimates for individual variables indicate that Pdiffi,1997 is estimated to be
positively signiﬁcant, indicating that source countries with higher pollution quota
30are more likely to invest in Iceland, a country that also has fairly high pollution
quotas. The government diﬀerence GMTSTdiffi,t is estimated as being positive;
this indicates that countries with more stable governments tend to invest more than
others.
Together, the economic size variables indicate that investment is more likely
made by smaller countries than large countries (since sum GDP is negative and
squared diﬀerence is positive). A negative interaction term indicates that as coun-
tries grow bigger, skill diﬀerences may have negative eﬀects. Finally, the distance
coeﬃcient indicates that investment is more likely to take place by countries that
are geographically closer.
Table 9B. KK model (LEVELS) Sample Selection
Second Step OLS Results
(1) (2) (3)












































Observations 129 129 129
Uncens. Obs. 30 30 30
Note: Heckman’s consistent Z - values are in parenthesis below coeﬃcients.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
The Mills ratio reported in Table 9B is estimated to be signiﬁcant in the two
latter regressions, indicating that the sample selection is estimated to be signiﬁcant
in these regressions; it is displayed in columns (2) and (3). Beyond this, the
31regression results in Table 9B tell us little about the sign of investment. This
implies that although the KK model does fairly well in explaining ﬁxed investment
cost, consistent with my earlier results presented in Kristjánsdóttir (2004c), it does
not do well in explaining the level of investment.
328.2 SHARES Heckman for the KK model
Although the KK model did not perform well for the Section 1 FDI level, the
results from before oﬀer hope that it will perform for FDI shares in Section 1. In
section 1, the sample selection basis is that investment shares are only observed
when multinationals undertake investment in Iceland within a particular year t.
Step one identiﬁes only the cases when some investment takes place in sector one.
Therefore, when FDI is presented in shares, the years of no investment are not
accounted for (since each sector has zero investment), so the binary variable takes
zero value in these cases. The results for this series of regressions are in Tables
10A and 10B.
Table 10A. KK model (SHARES) Sample Selection
F i r s tS t e pP r o b i tR e s u l t s
(1) (2) (3)










































Note: Heckman’s consistent Z - values are in parenthesis below coeﬃcients.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Since the sample selection stage in Tables 9A and 10A are the same, there is
obviously no diﬀerence between them. New results are in Table 10B, which account
for the marginal eﬀects on the FDI of sector 1 relative to other sectors.
33Table 10B. KK model (SHARES) Sample Selection
Second Step OLS Results
(1) (2) (3)












































Observations 129 129 129
Uncens. Obs. 30 30 30
Note: Heckman’s consistent Z - values are in parenthesis below coeﬃcients.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Given the share results from earlier in the paper, it is no surprise that many of
the variables in Table 10B are insigniﬁcant. What is primarily interesting about the
results in Table 10B is that the skill diﬀerence variable is estimated to be positive
and signiﬁcant in all three regressions even though it is insigniﬁcant in step one.
These positive estimates for skill diﬀerences indicate a tendency for investment to
occur in sector 1 relative to other sectors, because the source country becomes more
skilled29 relative to Iceland.
As Iceland becomes more skill abundant relative to the source, Sdiffi,t falls, and
the price of Icelandic skilled labor is expected to fall relative to skilled labor price
in the source country. According to these estimates, this increases the probability
of FDI in sector 1, but reduces its importance relative to overall FDI. Thus, cheap
Icelandic skill is important in ﬁxed costs but not in production in sector 1.
29Since skill diﬀerences are deﬁned as skillness of the source country minus the skillness of the
host country.
348.3 LEVELS Heckman for the GRAVITY model
When the results for Tables 9A, 9B, 10A, and 10B are taken together, it appears
as if the KK model analysis say something about whether countries are likely to
overcome ﬁxed cost. However, it appears that the KK model does not do too well
in explaining the level of investment. Thus, for comparison, I turn to the gravity
model presented and used in my earlier papers Kristjánsdóttir (2004a, 2004b).
As with the KK results in previous sections, I now explore sector 1 levels and
shares. The levels results are in Tables 11A and 11B. Again, following Razin et
al. (2003), my approach is to initially include the same variables in each stage. As
presented in column (1), the traditional gravity model does not do well in the second
stage. Therefore, in columns (2), (3), and (4), some additional factors are added
to the original gravity speciﬁcation to overcome the multicollinearity. problem. In
c o l u m n( 2 )s o u r c ec o u n t r ys k i l l 30 is added to step 1. Since the point of the KK
model is that endowments matter, it seems reasonable to include an endowment
proxy in the model. The level of skill is also added to the second step in column
(3) and (4).
In all three of these new speciﬁcations, higher source skill is associated with a
higher probability of investment in sector 1. However, it is not signiﬁcant in stage
2. The abundant, i.e. cheap source skill may be important for whether investment
occurs but not in the level of FDI. Source GDP is also positively correlated with the
likelihood of some FDI in sector 1. However, it is signiﬁcantly and positively related
to the level of FDI. Contrast this with source population, which is signiﬁcantly
negatively correlated with both the probability and level of FDI. Thus, at least
for levels, the wealth story of presented in Kristjánsdóttir (2004b) is again found.
The Icelandic variables appear insigniﬁcant for the selection stage. In the second
stage, however similar to the source wealth, higher Icelandic wealth is positively
30Source skill is used here, rather than skill diﬀerence for three reasons mainly. First, the
sample size would have too few observations, since skill diﬀerence may turn zero or negative in
several occations, because of the logarithm use. Second, when including skill diﬀerences in the
KK model, sample size was limited considerable because of few observations for level of skill in
the host country and insuﬃcient overlap of those with f.x. trade cost variables.
35correlated with FDI levels. A noteworthy diﬀerence is that whereas the source
GDP and population have coeﬃcients of roughly equal magnitudes, the Icelandic
population’s coeﬃcient is roughly four times that of Icelandic GDP. Moreover,
distance seems only important in the level stage, where it has the now the familiar
negative coeﬃcient. Finally, the Mills ratios imply that the sample selection is not
driving the unconditional OLS estimates.
When everything is considered, it appears that one of the main advantages of
applying the gravity speciﬁcation rather than the KK speciﬁcation to the Heckman
model is that the gravity speciﬁcation gives an indication of how host country
characteristics aﬀect FDI, whereas the KK speciﬁcation does not. It is nevertheless
important to include endowment data in the gravity model, a lesson that needs to
be credited to the KK literature.
Table 11A. Gravity (LEVELS) Sample Selection
F i r s tS t e pP r o b i tR e s u l t s
(1) (2) (3) (4)

























































Note: Heckman’s consistent Z - values are in parenthesis below coeﬃcients.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
36Table 11B. Gravity (LEVELS) Sample Selection
Second Step OLS Results





























































Observations 185 159 159 107
Uncens. Obs. 36 36 36 27
Note: Heckman’s consistent Z - values are in parenthesis below coeﬃcients.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
378.4 SHARES Heckman for the GRAVITY model
The ﬁnal regression results presented in this paper include the Heckman procedure
applied to a gravity speciﬁcation on FDI share data. These are presented in Tables
12A and 12B.
L i k ei nt h ec a s eo ft h eK Km o d e li nT a b l e s9 Aa n d1 0 A ,t h ee s t i m a t e sf o rt h e
ﬁrst step in gravity level and gravity share data are fully identical. This is due to
the fact that both represent the likelihood of investment taking place in sector one
in general. However estimates obtained for the second step for share in Table 12B,
diﬀer considerably from those in 11B.
Table 12A. Gravity (SHARES) Sample Selection
F i r s tS t e pP r o b i tR e s u l t s
(1) (2) (3) (4)

























































Note: Heckman’s consistent Z - values are in parenthesis below coeﬃcients.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
First, it is obvious that although the gravity model variables might help to
describe levels of FDI in sector one, they do little to describe the share of FDI in
that sector. They do indicate that as the Icelandic GDP grows, FDI is diversiﬁed
away from sector one. Estimates for distance indicate that once countries overcome
the threshold of investing in the power intensive sector, they are more likely to be
38attracted to sector one than other sectors, with an increase in costs associated with
increased distance.
These last results give a nice end to the story, since the power intensive goods
are normally shipped and likely to be less distance sensitive than many other prod-
ucts. They might therefore become an increasingly preferable investment option,
compared to other investment opportunities, as distance increases.
All considered, it appears as if anything, the gravity model does marginally bet-
ter than the knowledge-capital approach, since the estimates obtained are slightly
more signiﬁcant than those of the knowledge-capital model.
From Table 12B it can be concluded that a 1% increase in the source country
level of skill31 can be expected to result in about 0.2% increase in sector one share
of total FDI. Economically, this corresponds to the situation where if the source
country skilled labor (average of 21.35%) would move up by 1% i.e. to 21.56%,
then the share of sector one would increase from being 94.14% on average, to being
94.33% (note that the observations in the second step include only the years of
investment in sector one, and therefore the mean is very high).
Moreover, estimates indicate that as GDP in Iceland increases by 1%, then the
share of sector one in FDI decreases on by about 0.6%. The economic signiﬁcance
of these estimates could be interpreted such that a 1% increase in Iceland GDP
from $7 billion32 to $7.07 billion would aﬀect FDI such that the share of sector one
would go down from 94.14% to 93.67%.
As for source country GDP and population, as well as the population of Iceland,
coeﬃcient estimates indicate that these economic factors would not eﬀect the share
of sector one in overall FDI.
31These data are obtained from the International Labor Organization (ILO) as the sum of
occupational categories 0/1 and 2; where category 0/1 accounts for professional, technical, and
kindred workers, and category 2 for administrative workers. Moreover, the skilled labor ratio is
calculated as the sum of categories 0/1 and 2, divided by the sum of all occupational categories.
The skilled labor ratio is used as a proxy for relative skilled labor abundance.
32GDP values are on an 1995 base.
39Table 12B. Gravity (SHARES) Sample Selection
Second Step OLS Results





























































Observations 185 159 159 107
Uncens. Obs. 36 36 36 27
Note: Heckman’s consistent Z - values are in parenthesis below coeﬃcients.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Finally, estimates for distance indicate that an average increase in distance of
1% would involve an average increase in the share of sector one by about 0.4%.
The economic relationship eﬀects of these changes could be interpreted such that
if distance would increase from its average by 1%, moving up from and average of
4000 kilometers to 4040 kilometers, then the share of sector one is estimated to go
up from 94.14% to 94.52%.
409C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents analysis of foreign direct investment (FDI) allocated to diﬀerent
investment sectors in Iceland. Both levels of FDI and shares of FDI are estimated.
When estimated separately, it appears that diﬀerent forces are driving investment
in individual sectors. These results may possibly explain why the Knowledge Cap-
ital (KK) model speciﬁcation of Carr, Markusen, Maskus (CMM) did not perform
particularly well for aggregate Icelandic data in my earlier paper (Kristjánsdóttir,
2004c). In order to take a closer look at the dominating investment sector in Ice-
land, the power intensive sector, the sector is analyzed speciﬁcally by applying the
Heckman two-step procedure to test for sample selection. Estimates indicate the
threshold of overcoming ﬁxed cost does seem to be a critical issue when multina-
tionals choose to invest.
When sample selection is analyzed with a set of KK model variables, the proxy
for skill diﬀerence endowments is estimated to be negative for FDI levels, but pos-
itive in step two for FDI shares. This may indicate that source countries are
attracted by the level of skill in Iceland at the beginning stage of operations when
faced with ﬁx e dt h r e s h o l dc o s t . O n c et h ep l a n t sh a v eo v e r c o m eﬁxed costs, there
are positive impacts on marginal investment the more skilled the source country is
compared to the host. The KK model estimates by the Heckman procedure indi-
cate that it appears as if the KK model analysis helps in explaining why countries
are likely to overcome ﬁxed cost. Finally, when a set of gravity model variables are
applied in the Heckman procedure, it appears that they do a better job in explaining
the incentives for FDI. Estimates for endowments such as the level of skill of the
other country becomes more clear in the case of the gravity model, indicating that
an increase in the level of skill in the source country tends to positively eﬀect both
on the investment undertaken initially and the marginal increase thereafter. Also,
source and host country market sizes have a clearer interpretation in the gravity
model case, especially the host country estimates. It therefore appears that the
gravity model does a better job explaining investment.
4110 Appendix A. The Sample Selection Proce-
dure
The sample selection procedure can be described as follows. I start by presenting the





Following this I can present the basic model speciﬁcation as shown in Eq. (6):
yi= β
0xi+ i. (5)
Most of the time, the selection variable z∗ is not observed, but only its sign. In our
example, I observe only whether a source country invests in Iceland in a particular year
or not. This information implies the sign of z∗, but not its magnitude. Because I do
not have information on the scale of z∗, it is impossible to estimate the selection equation
variance.
Then the selection mechanism, capturing whether investment takes place or not, can






i =1 if z
∗
i > 0 and 0 otherwise; (6)
Prob(zi =1 ) = Φ(γ
0wi) and
Prob(zi =0 ) = 1 − Φ(γ
0wi).
The regression equation can be presented as follows:
yi = β
0xi +  i observed only if z
∗
i =1 , (7)
(ui,  i) ∼ bivariate normal[0,0,1,σ  ,ρ].
If I then suppose that zi and wi are observed for a random sample of observations,
and that I only observe yi when zi=1, then I can present the model as follows:
(E[yi| zi=1 ]=β
0x + ρσ λ(γ
0w). (8)
4211 Appendix B. The Kyoto Protocol
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations framework convention on climate change33.
Third session Kyoto, 1-10 December 199734.
Quantiﬁed emission limitation or reduction commitment
(percentage of base year or period)
Australia 108% Liechtenstein 92%
Austria 92% Lithuania* 92%
Belgium 92% Luxembourg 92%
Bulgaria* 92% Monaco 92%
Canada 94% Netherlands 92%
Croatia* 95% New Zealand 100%
Czech Republic* 92% Norway 101%
Denmark 92% Poland* 94%
Estonia* 92% Portugal 92%
European Community 92% Romania* 92%
Finland 92% Russian Federation* 100%
France 92% Slovakia* 92%
Germany 92% Slovenia* 92%
Greece 92% Spain 92%
Hungary* 94% Sweden 92%
Iceland 110% Switzerland 92%
Ireland 92% Ukraine* 100%
Italy 92% United Kingdom of Great Britain
Japan 94% and Northern Ireland 92%
Latvia* 92% United States of America 93%
* Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy
33English conference of the parties.
34Source: www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1997/global.warming/stories/treaty/index4.html
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